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According to the wise Roman jurists, if you take as a rule the 
most frequent cases, without worrying about possible exceptions, 
you are ordaining on the principle of plerumque fit. It is in 
this sense I am proposing here to codify rules that are not 
formally expressed, but which are well known by the most refined 
and ambitious minority of the Italian political class.
These rules institutionalize the recruitment process for positions 
of executive power. They have the advantage of rationalizing the 
means of access to cabinet positions, of eliminating the arbitrary, 
of orienting individual aspirations, and of avoiding congestion in 
the crossroads of political tareers, through a series of signals and 
traffic regulations. Thus, political competition, which is 
extremely individualistic in Rome, has been ordered as in a chess 
game.
Between the fall of fascism and Novermber 1982, 45 governments have 
followed one another, four before the end of the war. Among the 
41 governments, from Parri to Spadolini, 14 were composed of just 
Christian Democrats, and 27 were coalition governments.
These rules were established in a relatively short period of time, 
toward the end of the de Gasperi reign, and in light of the experi­
ences during the years 1953 and 1954: two Christian Democratic 
governments were still-born, for they did not obtain a vote of 
confidence in Parliament (De Gasperi 8th cabinet, Fanfani 1st 
cabinet), another was established but finally not appointed,
(Pella). These rules, never written, have been formalized since 
1954.
The analysis presented in these pages covers the period 1954-82.




























































































political life, the Christian Democratic Party, from whose ranks 
have been recruited all the prime ministers, except for Parri and 
Spadolini, and most of the ministers and undersecretaries of state.
It is important to underline here that the Chirstian Democratic 
Party governed alone for relatively little time, a fact which is 
too often forgotten, even in Roman political circles. Of the 14 
single-party governments (monocolori) only five remained in power 
more than one year (Zoli, Segni 2nd, Fanfani 3rd, Fanfani 4th, 
Andreotti 3rd). All others were "semestrial", "for the summer," 
on a "temporary armistice" basis, or still-born. Criticisms of 
the Christian Democratic Party neglect this fact, although the 
governmental responsibilities were shared by several parties most 
of the time.
The various governmental experiences have given birth to a very 
rich vocabulary currently used by the mass media: monocolor govern­
ments, monochromatic, bicolor, tricolor, tripartite, pentacolor, 
center-left, organic center, convergence, limited spectrum, enlarged 
spectrum, total spectrum, minority-governments-benefitting-from- 
the-non-defiance-of-one-party, etc.
It would consequently be naive to try to analyze such a complex 
phenomenon by mathematical models, no matter how sophisticated 
they may be. In Machiavelli's country, political reality is made 
up of a thousand nuances and any attempt at quantification would 
soon become simplistic. Even an application of coalition theory 
would be deceptive.
How to elucidate this apparent paradox: the immovability of the 
same party in power for more than one third of a century despite 




























































































of the explanations of this fact is that except between 1948 and 
1953, the Christian Democratic party, even if dominant, did not 
hold the majority of parliamentary seats.^ It thus had to ally 
itself with other parties, most of them small, and the disagree­
ments between them were a source of ministerial instability.
The other explanation of this apparent contradiction between 
immovability and instability comes from the factional nature of 
the Christian Democratic Party. A coalition government does not 
only rest on a big party flanked by two or three other small 
parties, but also on several factions of the central party, of 
the perpetually median party. It is sufficient that one or two 
of these factions want a change in policy, to endanger the life 
of the government. Since the political game often takes on a 
Byzantine character, many governments have been overturned by 
an initiative coming from within the dominant party. It is not 
possible to establish a direct relation between the activity of 
this or that faction and the fall of the government. There is 
always a conjunction of factors.
The rules of promotion are enumered here according neither to 
their importance, nor to any chronological sequence in the selec­
tion process, since they intervene simultaneously. The logic of 
their linkage is nevertheless clear. Undoubtedly, it is rule 7 
which is most dependent on the political game and which receives, 
in times of ministerial crisis, most attention.
It is through interviews with politicians, high civil servants 
and astute observers, that I was able to formulate these non- 
written rules. My interlocutors, including ex-ministers and 
potential future ministers, recognized them as true, even if they 




























































































possible for well founded reasons.
THE SUMMIT OF THE CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRATIC PYRAMID
From June 1945 to Novermber 1982, 653 persons occupied executive 
(3)positions, among whom 414 were Christian-Democrats. Seen from 
afar, these 414 personalities, situated at the summit of the dom­
inant party's pyramid, present many common characteristics. In 
reality, it is a very diversified ruling group. To fully compre­
hend it, one must observe it from several angles, particularly 
by considering the varying weights of the different ministries, and 
the political generations.
One can distinguish four levels among Christian-Democratic ministers:
A) The leaders of the party and of the factions, constituting 
what could be called the governmental nucleus, namely the 
prime ministers and the most important ministers, those who 
belonged to eight governments or more. As can be seen in Table 1, 
this nucleus includes 36 personalities.
B) The ministers who belonged to a maximum of seven governments 
and a minumum of three; they form, around the nucleus, what 
could be called the "governmental circle". It includes 48 
ministers.
C) The ministers who belonged to only one or two governments, 
making up an enlarged circle of power and including 49 
individuals.
D) The undersecretaries of state, who have never reached the
level of full ministership. They are twice as numerous as 




























































































These figures, simple but essential, reflect the situation at
(4)a certain moment, in November 1982. But it is evident that
the career of some of these men is not finished. Over the years, 
some ministers will continue their upward climb, and new men 
will appear on the front stage. Nevertheless, the political 
careers of most of these 414 men ended a long time ago.
If the rules of the political game continue as before, in ten 
years statistical tables on ministers and undersecretaries of 
state will indicate a distribution in four categories similar 
to the one we are presenting here, although the absolute 
figures shown will be higher.
One may observe three generations within the Christian Demo­
cratic political class.
The first generation includes men born before 1910. While 
this criterion is too rigid to be entirely satisfactory, it 
nevertheless has the merit of being precise. Of the 414 
ministers 161 were born before 1910. As can be seen from 
Table 1, most of the leaders from the "governmental nucleus" 
belong to this first generation: 21 out of 36, as well as 66 
out of 133 ministers of the "extended governmental circle."
To this first generation belong men of the stature of De Gasperi, 
Gronchi, Segni, Pella, Zoli, Tambroni, Vanoni, Togni, Gonella, 
Gava, Medici, Piccioni, Pastore, etc. ^  (as well as many 
leaders of other parties, particularly Togliatti, Nenni, Saragat, 
Einaudi or Parri). Twenty or thirty years before their acces­
sion to power, each one knew all the others and was known by all 
of them. The implication of this fact for the process of poli­




























































































there is no spontaneous generation, not even at the juncture 
of two historical periods. In effect, most of these men were 
elders of the Popular party. Others, without being ex-popolari, 
came from the network of Catholic Action. Among the 66 mini­
sters born before 1910, that is more than 33 years old at the 
breakdown of the fascist regime, one could count 48 whose bio­
graphies are marked by these three characteristics: affiliation
to the Popular party, activity in Catholic Action, and parti-
(6)cipation in the Resistance movement. This observation is
also valid for 76 of the 95 undersecretaries of state of the 
first generation.
The second generation of ministers was born after 1910 and 
raised in the League of Catholic Graduates. They include 
leaders like More, Rumor, Taviani, Gui, Piccoli, Fanfani 
(even if born in 1908, Fanfani belongs sociologically to this 
second generation). They erupted on the political arena at 
the Christian Democratic Congress in Venice in 1949.
The third generation was raised in the "Palace Court" of 
the Christian Democratic Party already in power, first in the 
youth movement, then in the party apparatus. They are profes­
sional politicains in the sense that they never had any regular 
jobs other than political ones, and they climbed the ladder by 
cooptation and patronage. This generation is illustrated by men 
like: Colombo, Andreotti, Forlani, Cossiga, Donat-Cattin, 
Gullotti, Sullo, Marcora, Granelli, De Mita, Sarti, Malfatti, 
Ciceardini, Bodrato, Arnaud, etc. Many of the men of the third 
generation prepared themselves for their political career on the 
editorial boards of newspapers and weekly journals.




























































































careers. It seems nevertheless clear that the roots of the 
second generation are imbedded in the catholic organizations, 
with a high proportion of them also involved in the Resitance 
movement, while most of the third generation began directly 
in the local, provincial, and regional organizations of the 
Christian Democratic Party.
The various rules of promotion do not evidently have the same
(7)significance for each of these three generations.
RULE 1:
THE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE RECRUITED: AMONG PARLIAMENTARIANS
The aspirant to ministerial positions should be a deputy or a 
senator. In effect, one can only count a handful of ministers 
who did not have a parliamentary mandate at the moment of their 
appointment. These few were experts or high civil servants, 
whose situation was "regularized", in the sense that their 
election was arranged at the first occasion. Among these 
exceptions, we could mention Corbellini, a railroad technician, 
appointed minister in 1947 because of his competence in the 
domain of public transportation; Bonifacio, member of the 
Constitutional Court; Stammati, former general director of the 
Treasury, and general accountant of the state, appointed 
minister of the Treasury; Ossola, former governor of the Bank 
of Italy.
It should be noted that this rule is practiced in most of the 
parliamentary democracies. The exceptions are France and the 
United States, which have presidential systems, as well as 
Netherlands and Norway, which have established an incompati­




























































































Ministers and undersecretaries of state 





2nd and 3rd 
generations Total




Ministers 8 times or more 12 9 21 36 ..|
Ministers 5, 6, 7 times 8 19 27 L•jj governmental}
Ministers 3 or 4 times 8 13 21 circle 48
Ministers 1 or 2 times 29 20 49 extended




Undersecretaries of State 7 7 14
8 to 13 times 281
Undersecretaries of State 17 36 53 around
5 , 6, 7 t ime s the
Undersecretaries of State 22 48 70 circle
3, 4 t ime s
Undersecretaries of State 49 95 144
| 1, 2 t ime s !
































































































The question that should be asked regarding Italy is why so much 
attention is given to these experts. Should one see here the 
symptom of a certain discrediting of the professional political 
men in the public opinion? These experts are not apolitical 
men. They have a double quality: they are considered competent 
in a particular domain, such as finance, but it is admitted 
that even if they follow in the wake of a party, they are not 
men of the party's political apparatus, and this is an essential 
point.
About one quarter of the ministers and undersecretaries of state 
were senators at the moment of their appointment. The proportion 
of senators among ministers varied from 10% in 1948 to 40% in 
1963. Nevertheless, among the ministers belonging to what we call 
the "governmental nucleus," the deputies dominate by a proportion 
of 85%. This is becuase the politicians who have dominated 
Italian political life during the last three decades were already 
in place at the beginning of the Republic. They were elected to 
the Constituent Assembly in 1946, which obviously should be seen 
as equivalent to the Chamber of Deputies, and they were reelected 
there regularly.
Later, a certain number of leaders opted for the Senate, prefer­
ring safe senatorial constituencies, so that the number of 
senators among Christian Democratic ministers has stabilized 
since 1970 at between 25% and 30%.
If the constitution had not provided that the government should 
obtain the confidence of both assemblies, and if, as in many 
countries, the confidence of the Chmaber of Deputies had sufficed, 




























































































smaller (and one of the causes of ministerial instability would 
have disappeared).
RULE 2:
ONE DOES NOT ACCEDE TO GOVERNMENT DURING A FIRST TENURE
A reelection is needed in order to open the possibility of reaching 
the governmental level. What are the reasons for the adoption of 
such a rule? Because of the preferential vote, practiced largely 
in legislative elections, the number of defeated parliamentarians, 
and consequently of new deputies, is relatively high: on average 
one third of the total membership of the Chamber of Deputies. If the 
choice of ministers is limited to the reelected former deputies, 
if the "greenhouse" is restricted, so much the better for those who 
are already there, that is to say those reelected. The rule of the 
waiting term before promotion to government protects the elders 
against the competition and the impatience of the new parliament­
arians. Furthermore, to the degree that the stature and prestige 
of the ministers reinforces their local electoral position by the 
practice of preferential voting and clientelism, this rule allows 
the former ministers to deprive the new deputies of a precious 
trump for their reelection. Those non-reelected leave room for 
new deputies, who will not immediately compete with their 
seniors.
Denouncing "delayed change in the leadership and representation," 
Amintore Fanfani criticized at the National Council of the Christian 
Democratic Party in 1974 "the practice of the groups which do not 
accept the appointment of newly elected parliamentarians to govern-




























































































years after the war. These cases had to do with men who played an 
important political role before 1922 and in the opposition against 
the fascist regime, and who found themselves together once again in 
the Costituent Assembly. We count 32 personalities, most of them 
notorious resistants who came to power before 1948. But these 32 
personalities are not the only ones to escape the rule of the wait­
ing term. There are 23 others who became ministers before the end 
of their first term: they represent about 5% of the total number of 
ministers. One must also note that two thirds of them became under­
secretaries of state or ministers before 1954, that is a moment close 
to the foundation of the Republic. After that, the exceptions to 
this rule became exteremely rare. An example is the case of Ferrari 
Aggradi, who made himself noticed by a report on the economic 
situation to the Christian Democratic Congress in 1952, and who was 
appointed undersecretary of state soon thereafter, even though he was 
then only a newly elected deputy.
It should be noted that this practice can be observed in other 
countries too. In England, the chances of being appointed to a 
government position during the first mandate are minimal, except in 
certain historical circumstances, such as when the Labour Party 
arrived in power for the first time, or when it returned to power 
after a long absence.
RULE 3:
ONE DOES NOT BECOME A MINISTER WITHOUT PREVIOUSLY BEING UNDER- 
SECRETARY OF STATE
One is first appointed undersecretary of state, and only later 




























































































October 1980, the Christian Democratic group in the Chamber of 
Deputies, according to its internal procedures, drew up a list 
of deputies, by secret ballot, among whom the prime minister and 
the leaders of the party chose - after the appointment of mini­
sters but before their investitute - the undersecretaries of state. 
The list sometimes included twice as many names as positions to be 
filled. The prime minister and the party leadership could choose 
between those elected by the group, but not among others. Through 
this ballot, the new and therefore "ineligible" deputies (according 
to rule 2) played a role in the selection among the elders. This 
"election" by the group was not entirely satisfactory, for in 
October 1980, just before the constitution of the Forlani govern­
ment, the group decided by a large majority to suppress this norm, 
and to delegate to a committee of the parliamentary group the 
privilege of drawing up the list of "promotable" deputies to the 
rank of undersecretary of state. The committee drew up this list 
by taking into consideration the activity of parliamentarians in 
their party, their seniority in Parlaiment, the length of positions 
held elesewhere, and for some, their specialization.
Theoretically, it is the council of ministers that chooses and 
appoints undersecretaries of state. The proof that in reality 
it contents itself with confirming a list already established by 
the leaders of the parties of the governmental coalition is the 
fact - simple but enlightening - that it takes this decision
th<during a very brief session. For instance, the council of ministers 
met on October 2, 1980, did not take more than 50 minutes to appoint 
57 undersecretaries of state.
Some figures should be kept in mind. The total number of under­




























































































later promoted ministers (at least until November 1982), that is 24%. 
Among the 281 undersecretaries of state who never reached the rank of 
full minister, 88 belonged to only one government, 56 to two govern­
ments or more. Some of these undersecretaries will probably be promo­
ted ministers in the coming years, but it is already evident that for 
the great majority of them,80% or more, the undersecretary of state 
was not a step but a summit.
From a different point of view, among the 133 ministers in the full 
sense of the word, 84 started as undersecretaries of state, and 49 
were directly appointed full ministers. But it should be emphasized 
that among these 49 ministers, 31 belonged to the first generation, 
most of them having been prominent in political life before 1922 or 
in the resistance movement against the fascists. Furthermore, they 
acceded to power before 1954, that is to say in a period when this 
rule was still in its gestation.
The deviation from the rule for the remaining 18 men, born after 1910, 
who skipped the level of undersecretary of state could be explained by 
several intricacies. First an equivalence exists between a position 
at the summit of the party and the position of undersecretary of state. 
Regional or local notoriety may intervene in the same direction: 
Ripamonti, a Milanese personality, acceded directly to the rank of full 
minister; likewise, Restivo, president of the Sicialian regional 
assembly, and A. Gava, president of the regional council of Campania.
The vice president of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies naturally 
skipped the level of undersecretary of state. These titles imply de 
facto or predominant position within the Cristian Democratic Party. For 
instance, G. Bartolomei, president of the Christian Democratic group 
in the Senate during three legislatures, became minister directly.




























































































exception, are also included: Forlani, Piccoli, Gullotti, Marcora, 
Rognoni, Signorello, Codacci, Pisanelli, Andreatta, Corbellini, 
Bodrato, Dal Falco, Lombardini, Scaglia, Tesini.
The presidency of a parliamentary committee is not necessarily 
considered an equivalent position to that of undersecretary of 
state. In a "classical" type of parliamentary system where par­
liament is the regime's center of gravity, such as in France
(9)during the 3rd Republic it is normal that promotion is chan­
neled in great part through the parliamentary committees. But 
in a "partitocrazia", where the most important decisions are 
taken by the leaders of the parties, political careers are forged 
outside parliament in the organizations and factions of parties.
It is not astonishing, therefore, to find that in Italy, contrary 
to other countries, the position of chairman of a parliamentary
j
committee is not a springboard. In effect, there are very few 
political men whose promotion to ministerial rank could be 
explained mainly by their active role in a parliamentary committee. 
Among these rare examples could be mentioned Angelini, president of 
the Commission of Transportation; Monaldi, a doctor directly 
appointed minister of Health; Azara, a jurist appointed minister of 
Justice; Trabucchi, an industialist appointed minister of Finance: 
Medici, a specialist in agricultural affairs, appointed minister of 
Agriculture.
The number of undersecretaries of state progressively increased 
from 1946 to 1980. In the last decade there were twice as many 
undersecretaries of state as ministers. In the "monocolor" govern­
ments, composed exclusively of Christian Democrats, one deputy for 
every two having a seniority of five years could receive either a 




























































































too, a large number of MPs of the majority party are junior 
ministers). Because other deputies and senators simultaneously 
held important positions in the party hierarchy, it could be 
said that the majority of Christian Democrat deputies were 
rewarded.
In any case, a great number of undersecretaries of state were 
appointed for the first time (or the only time) on the occasion 
of the formation of a "monocolor" government. So, the second 
Rumor government (monocolor) in August 1969, which succeeded the 
first Rumor government (coalition), included 30 undersecretaries 
of state who did not belong to the previous government (and only 
four outgoing ministers were not reconfirmed).
Satisfying the greatest possible number of deputies is a necessity 
for the survival of the government in a parliamentary system which 
practices the secret ballot, thus permitting all maneuvers. Several 
governments have felt stabbed in the back by "snipers" belonging to 
the governmental majority itself. Although a formal vote of confi­
dence in government is nominal and consequently disciplined, the 
adoption of laws and the ratification of decrees are done by secret 
vote. The government can be put without warning in minority by the 
vote of "snipers" who hope to obtain a ministerial position thanks 
to a crisis and a change of government. The ambition of those who 
are, or believe themselves to be potential ministers is a source
of ministerial instability, as in France during the Third and Fourth
o  m  • U0>Republics.




























































































necessary stage on the road to full ministership applies only 
to the dominant Christian Democrat Party. This rule does not apply 
to the other parties, which participate in coalition governments 
after long periods in opposition and which receive, in these coal­
ition governments, only a small number of ministerial posts; too 
many of their leaders have aged while in opposition.
What power do these undersecretaries of state hold? Most of them 
are ephemeral men at the governmental level, even if they are 
famous personalities in their provinces, where they may reign 
as 'lords' for 20-30 years. Others, without being entirely 
ephemeral, since they belonged to three or more governments, remain
outside the ruling group.-
RULE 4:
THE POSITION OF UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE IS LIMITED TO FIVE YEARS
No one can remain more than five years as undersecretary of state.
If during this period the promotion to full ministership does not 
take place, the holder is in fact excluded from potential govern­
mental circles. No one can indefinitely remain undersecretary of 
state. Promotion or exclusion! This is a custom that one finds 
in other countries too, particularly in England. It could also be 
found in certain public adminstrations which limit the time a person 
can occupy a certain position.
This rule of five years seniority poses a maximal, but not a 
minimal limit. It is not necessary to be undersecretary of state 
for five years in order to be appointed minister. The rule is 
interpreted with some flexibility. It is not applied in case of 




























































































available post of full minister. It is rare that one returns 
to government as an undersecretary of state after a long inter­
ruption.
What is the significance of this rule? Should it be interpreted 
in terms of experince or competence, as in England, where the 
junior minster must show that he has the quality of a statesman?
Is it justified by the need periodically to make room for new men? 
But what if this rule were adopted not only to ensure a circulation, 
but also in a Machiavellian spirit, to eliminate a certain number 
of middle-of-the-road competitors? This rule facilitates the 
promotion of new men to the rank of undersecretary of state, but 
at the same time it protects the great leaders against the imp­
atience of men who, having already unsheathed their swords as 
undersecretaries of state, believe, rightly or wrongly, that their 
turn has arrived. Significant from this point of view, is the 
unusual propositon formulated by a large number of Christian Demo­
cratic deputies in February 1976, at the moment of the formation 
of the fifth Moro government. They asked the designated prime 
minister not to choose as ministers personalities who already had 
held ministerial responsibilities for more than eight years (since 
their first appointment). This proposition focused on the exclu­
sion from government of men as influential as Rumor, Colombo, 
Donat-Cattin, Andreotti, Fanfani and a few others. It seems that 
this action was initiated by some former undersecretaries of state 
aspiring to become full ministers. They in turn would thus have 
liberated places for new undersecretaries of state, and this 
explains why the proposition, judged unreasonable at the highest 
level, nevertheless found a favourable response among the junior 
parliamentarians. This incident reflects the latsit competition 
between generations among Christian Democrats. If Pareto were 





























































































Certain men remained undersecretaries of state for a long time. 
Should this longevity be interpreted as a success or as a half­
failure? It is good to remain undersecretary of state, but it 
is even better to be promoted minister. A few concrete examples 
will provide us with some elements of a reply.
A. Sallzzoni, who was undersecretary of state thirteen times, in 
reality occupied a better strategic position than that of many 
ministers responsible for important administrations. He was in 
effect, as undersecretary of state to the presidency of the Council 
of Ministry, one of Moro's most intimate collaborators in the 
five governments directed by the latter. The function of under­
secretary of state in the ministry of Foreign Affairs or of the 
Interior, which he exercised at other moments, could be considered, 
in certain circumstances, more important than the function of full 
minister of Tourism or of the Post.
G. Bosori was undersecretary of state in eleven governments 
between 1953 and 1963 almost without interruption, but it was 
always to the ministry of the Interior, where he undoubteldly 
acquired high competence in a domain considered to be essential.
Maria Badaloni was appointed undersecretary of state nine times, 
but always to the ministry of Public Education. It was necessary 
to have a woman appear among the male ministers, even if she was 
only offered, albeit in a gallant manner, a ministerial "stool".




























































































to the Treasury, never been promoted? It might be because of the 
difficulty of finding, in a coalition government, a position as 
full minister for a man who was not a leader of a faction ("capo 
corrente"). In any event, among the non-promoted undersecretaries 
of state who remained immobile for a long period, once could find 
men who were specialized in a particular sector.
Another non-written rule of the political game should be mentioned 
here, even if it is not directly related to the selection of mini­
sters. A Christian Democrat who served four parliamentary terms, 
that is twenty years, and was not promoted undersecretary of state, 
"should" abstain from running for a fifth mandate. The other 
parties, particularly the Communist party, have also limited the 
length of the parliamentary careers of their members, except for 
the leaders; if Roberto Michels were still alive, he could test 
his "iron law of ologarchy" once more.
RULE 5:
ALL REGIONS SHOULD BE REPRESENTED IN THE GOVERNMENT
This principle of regional representation is respected in various 
countries, as in Germany, Belgium (from a linguistic point of view), 
Nigeria etc. But in Italy, this geographical perscription sometimes 
takes on the aspect of a distribution between "baronages." In 
effect, due to the Italian electoral system, based on proportional 
representation, large constitutencies, and preferential voting, 
each great leader is well protected in his own constituency against 
the direct competition of other great leaders: Andreotti in Latium,
Rumor in Veneto, Segni in Sardinia, Colombo in Basilicata, Taviani 
in Liguria, Tambroni in Marche, Gioia in Western Sicily and Gullotti 




























































































on the territory of other male lions.
The regional leaders are at the same time leaders of factions at 
the national level. When a government is formed, the regional 
dosage and the factional dosage (a point to be discussed later) are 
inseparable. To give a ministerial portfolio to any faction means 
to bring the "baron" of that region into government, and vice versa. 
To represent every region in each successive government would imply 
a monopoly of certain regional leaders. Fanfani was well aware of 
this. Recognizing "that the change was not always accomplished on 
the basis of wise criteria", he also admitted the incompatibility 
between a rigourous regional representation and personal competence 
as a priority criterion: "Other obstacles came from the presumption 
that the candidates for various posts should have true territorial 
origins in order to respond to the expectation of regions, provinces 
and cities. These obstacles had so much impact on selection based 
on merit and competence that it restricted the range of choice."
In practice, the geographical dosage is satisfied considering that 
even an undersecretary of state is sufficient to represent a region 
in the government. If it were otherwise, the Christian Democratic 
leader of each important region would be permanently present in the 
government.
An analysis of the relations, for all regions, between the number 
of Christian Democratic electors and of the ministers during the 
three decades from 1948-1978 shows that the correlation is signifi­
cant, though far from perfect: Lombardia, Emilia, and Tuscany have^
proportionally fewer ministers than voters. the opposite being true





























































































COMPETENCE IS ACQUIRED THROUGH EXPERIENCE
Such a principle clarifies the criteria for the selection of 
ministers as well as the sublety of the political game in Rome.
It could be argued that a man who is able toreach the heighest 
levels within his party is a competent political man, in the most 
general sense of the word. But one could ask whether someone who 
shows himself astute in the partisan network and who has succeeded 
in obtaining preferential votes by imaginative propaganda, also 
necessarily possesses the qualities required of a statesman. Does 
a person who has spent twenty years in partisan politics and in the 
labyrinth of factions, without giving priority to parliamentary 
debates or activity in specialized committees, have the same profile 
as his French or English counterpart, who has acquired experience in 
parliament and the administration rather than in the party? Cert­
ainly in the selection of ministers, representativeness is sometimes 
as important as competence, but competence cannot be weighed by 
milligrams whereas the other is very visible. Undoubtedly, it is 
an amalgamation that ensures the best selection.
What is at issue here is the deliberate and systematic priority 
that is given to partisan criteria, often to the detriment of com­
petence. I obtained the testimony of many Italian politi
judged that expertise is not an essential reason for prom
government.
The proof that competence is not the main criterion in the selec­





























































































formation. The number of ministers to be attributed to each party 
and each faction is determined first. Then, the departments are 
distributed. The factions do not necessarily have the competent 
men for the domains that are attributed to them. The distribution 
of departments between parties and factions and the designation of 
men by the factions are two independent processes, usually occur­
ring at different moments in time.
It is too easily admitted in the Roman political milieu that com­
petence is acquired through practice, that it results from experi­
ence, that the politicians should and can adapt himself rapidly to 
the governmental functions assigned to him. How can this be pos­
sible if the minister in question does not remain in his position 
more than a few months, if he moves from agriculture to transport, 
from education to social security? No doubt the minister does not 
need to be a specialist. Yet he must still familiarize himself with 
the problems of the ministerial department with which he is charged. 
It is significant that some journalists who advocated a selection of 
ministers based primarily on competence were accused of expressing 
"anti-democratic opinions."
The limited role played by the parliamentary committees in the 
selection process has already been stressed: the presidency of a 
committee does not constitute a springboard for ministerial appoint­
ment since these chairmanships are usually reserved for ex-ministers, 
instead of being a channel of access to government. That is to say, 
the succession of stages is reversed. There are some exceptions: 
Pandolfi, Bressani, Cossiga, and others revealed themselves in 
parliamentary committees.




























































































another channel, the faction, which will now be examined, plays a 
determining role.
RULE 7:
THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT PROPORTIONALLY REFLECTS THE 
STRENGTH OF FACTIONS WITHIN THE PARTY
The national council of the Christian Democratic Party is elected 
at the party congresses. It includes representatives from the 
groups in the Chamber and in the Senate, as well as from various 
satellite organizations. The election of the council is carried 
out according to lists that represent factions. The delegates 
have a number of mandates determined by the number of adherents 
and voters in their constituencies. The numbers of the national 
council are elected by proportional representation. So, in 1973, 
the Iniziativa Popolare faction (Rumor, Piccoli, Taviani) repre­
sented 35% of the national council; the Nuove Cronache faction 
(Fanfani, Forlani) 20%; Impegno Democratico (Andreotti, Colombo) 
15%; Base 9%; Forze Nuove 8%; Moro9%, others 1%.
The idea that the Christian Democratic representation in govern­
ment should be proportional to the composition by factions of the 
national council became accepted soon after the retirement of 
De Gasperi. The proportional calculation has been ingeniously 
worked out. It is considered that a full ministerial portfolio
(13)is equivalent to three undersecretariats of state. The value
attributed to the presidency of the council of ministers is very 
significant: it is worth only two ministries. The number of 
points thus calculated is distributed among the factions accord­
ing to their strenghts in the national council of the party. For 




























































































60 points, and 50 secretaries of state, counting for 50 points, we 
reach the total, including the prime minister, who "weights" 6 
points, to be proportionately distributed. In practice, the 
dosage is not so simple, as witnessed by the length of negotia­
tions at the moment of a new government's formation.
All factions of the party are normally represented in government. 
Nevertheless, in a few circumstances, one or two factions have 
refused to occupy the ministerial positions to which they had the 
right. For instance, one leftist faction did not participate in 
the Tambroni government, which was oriented toward the right. 
Similarly, the "democratic left" (Marcora, Granelli, De Mita) 
refused to participate in the "monocolor" Rumor government. 
Sometimes the collaboration of certain factions is obtained for 
"the management of current affairs." In this case, it is con­
sidered that participation is ideologically neutral.
In the coalition governments, the number of ministries and under­
secretaries of state going to the Christian Democrats are reduced, 
and consequently the application of proportionality is only approx­
imate. In the last few years, one speaks less and less of rigorous 
proportionality, and more about "majority" and "minority" within 
the Christian Democratic party.
Some journalists attach excessive importance to the so-called 
"Cencelli manual", to which the Christian Democrats almost never 
refer. This "manual" consists of several disparate pages concer­
ning the proportional calculations for the distribution of mini­
sterial portfolios and undersecretaryships among parties and 
factions. I verified how this principle of proportionality was 




























































































between the spectrum of factions and the distribution of port­
folios and semi-portfolios, not even for the "monocolor" govern­
ments. It would be an insult to the intelligence of political 
leaders to believe that the distribution of ministerial depart­
ments could be made with a slide-rule. Mentioning decimals in 
analyzing a sophisticated and complex political game is to cari­
cature a priniciple which is legitimate in one sense, and which
has been practiced not only in the consociational democracies
(14)(Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland) , but also in 
many political regimes which have adopted proportional representa­
tion .
In Italy, proportionality cannot be rigorous, first because the
(15)ministerial departments are not all of equal importance; 
secondly, because the cooptation of an expert, even "outside the 
quota" or of a personal friend of the prime minister, may render 
the calculus of proportionality artificial. Furthermore, because 
the factions are unstable, a reference to the previous elections 
of the national council can rapidly become invalid. But above 
all, there are important positions within the party which can be 
offered as compensation to factions and personalities that are 
insufficiently satisfied, as well as some positions in the par­
liamentary assemblies, like chairmanships of committees. The 
cirteria of equivalences are subtle and conform to democratic 
principles.
It would be useful to quote here one of the typical comments 
that can be read in the newspapers during ministerial crises.
This comment implicitly confirms that, for the best informed 





























































































ministerial positions is out of the question. It also shows, 
like many other expressions, by' its hermetic vocabulary, the 
distance that separates the political class from the popular 
masses. It is in effect highly probable that more than 90% of 
the citizens remain completely cool toward the competition bet­
ween the factions. Among the pluralistic democracies, the only 
country comparable to Italy in this respect is Japan. Here is 
the text, concise though it may be: "For the Christian Democratic 
party, eight ministerial positions will go to the majority and 
six to the minority. Among the eight of the majority, three should 
be dorotei; one would go to the Fanfaniani who would also have the 
presidency for the Council; one to the friends of Colombo; one to 
the group of Rumor; and one to the Forze Nuove faction. Out of
the six of the minority, four would go to the Zaccagnini reserve
(16)and two to the Andreottiani. The historian of the year 2000
will have to be a goldsmith to orient himself in this labyrinth 
of factions.
RULE 8:
THE MINISTERIAL POSITIONS ARE DISTRIBUTED TO THE FACTIONS WHICH 
PROPOSE THEIR REPRESENTATIVES TO GOVERNMENT
Contrary to constitutional provisions, it is not the prime mini­
ster who chooses the ministers. The main preoccupation of the man 
in charge of building a governmental coalition is "the dosage".
He does not have the power to select the members of his government, 
for the parties do this according to the proposals of factions, 
which designate their own representatives. In the last analysis, 
the government is a committee of delegates of factions. Consequ­




























































































internal dislocation, and not from the pressure of the opposition. 
The contrast between the solidarity of the British cabinet and the 
heterogeneity of the Italian government, reflects the difference 
between the two political regimes.
It is the leaders who propose the representatives of their party
to government, often not forgetting to designate themselves. The
entire system is based on this possible fusion of roles: the man
(17)who designated can also be the designated man. There is
certainly an incompatibility between the ministerial functions and 
those of the party leadership. But one leads to the other. Several 
times the general secretary of the Christian Democratic party has 
become prime minister: De Gasperi, Fanfani, Rumor, Moro.
The existence of a permanent nucleus of influential men, on one 
side, and of a large number of ephemeral politicians, who only pass 
through, on the other, can be explained by this practice of self- 
designation.
One becomes minister because one is the chief of a faction. The 
chronology of the two positions leaves no doubt about this. How 
the selection is done within the faction, is a problem we cannot 
deal with here, for it would necessitate going into too many 
details.
This model was in operation between 1954 and 1979. After De 
Gasperi's resignation, his successor, Pella, in 1953, himself 
selected the ministers and undersecretaries of state for a 
"monocolor" government; but this manifestation of independence 




























































































A new attempt in this same spirit, by Fanfani, resulted in failure
ten days later. Scelba, who followed Fanfani, learned the lesson,
and constituted a government of "delegates and representatives"
from various factions in his party (with which two small parties
were associated: Social Democrats and Liberals). During a quarter
of a century, the prime minister exercised only a very limited
influence in the choice of ministers. This influence was also
discreet, because it could only be manifested during a meeting
with the general secretary of the party and the presidents of the
groups in the Chamber and Senate. This "tetrachy", as it is called,
could communicate beyond the "conclave" only with the bosses of the
(18)factions - a detail full of significance.
In 1979, Cossiga innovated when he formed his first cabinet after
a series of "semestrial" governments and various ministerial crises:
he asked the parties composing the majority, his own included, to
indicate several names, among whom he could choose. From the
Liberal Party, for instance, he asked three times more names than
(19)there were positions to be filled. This new strategy could in
part be explained by the lesson that the new prime minister drew 
from the unfortunate experience of Pandolfi, who had been desig­
nated a few days earlier by President Pertini to build a coalition 
government. After laborious negotiations and multiple modifications 
to the list of ministers, Pandolfi presented himself to the 
Quirinale. During his audience with the President of the Republic, 
he was called to the telephone by the leaders of the Socialist party, 
who told him that they did not like his "final list". Pandolfi was 
thus obliged to renounce his mission, not because of the competi­
tion among the factions of his own party but because the ministerial 
composition displeased the Socialists. "This is the first Govern­




























































































strategic position, Luigi Granelli.
At the time of the constitution of his second government in April 
1980, Cossiga had to bow to the rules of the game and to accept 
the designation formulated by the parties.
A new infringement on the norm occurred with the formation of the 
Forlani cabinet, in October 1980, whose gestation was observed in 
vitro. The general secretaries of the four parties forming the 
coalition (Piccoli, Craxi, Longo and Spadolini), met at the Chigi 
Palace with the prime minister designate. A list of new ministers 
was prepared, including 14 from the left (Socialists, Social 
Democrats and Republicans), and 14 Christian Democrats. Between 
1 a.m. and 11 a.m. when Forlani arrived at the Quirinale Palace to 
present the list of ministers to President Pertini, six out of the 
14 Christian Democratic nominees were replaced by others, following 
pressures exercised by various leaders, and also because of the 
unusual refusal by the President of the Republic to change the 
three ministers directly responsible for the struggle against ter­
rorism (Interior, Defense, Justice), of whom only one was on the 
initial list. The prime minister designate therefore had to accept 
the request of the President of the Republic - a prerogative that 
had fallen out of use - as well as the demands of the leadership of 
his own party, which was more in conformity with the practice of the 
last quarter century.
The representatives of the other three parties had been designated 
by their own parties before the meeting of the general secretaries: 
here is what someone could have read in the official newspaper of 




























































































and Senate together with the executive committee are meeting in 
order to designate the colleagues (comrades) who will be destined 
to assume ministerial responsibilities, either as ministers or 
undersecretaries of state." At the same moment many news­
papers informed their readers about the meetings of the two other 
parties' leaders for the same purpose: the designation of the
representatives of the party to the government.
It is certain that, with a few exceptions, a career within the 
party precedes a career in the government. For example, nearly 
all members of the exectutive committee in 1949, were later cal­
led to governmental functions. This was likewise true for nearly 
all parliamentary members of the national council elected at the 
same moment (with the exceptions of Dossetti, La Pira, Cappi, 
Lazzati, and two union leaders). This observation also applies 
to the parliamentary members of the national council elected in 
1962 .
On the contrary, very few provincial secretaries in office in 1952 
were called to government during the following thirty years: 10 
out of 93. The ambitious young men of today should learn the 
lesson: it is better, should they aspire to become ministers, 
not to focus on the position of provincial secretary. All prov­
incial roads do not lead to Rome! Once arriving in Rome, that is 
having become deputies or senators, they would do better, as 
Machiavelli would have said, to reserve the best of their time 
and energy to the party and its factions, not to the parliamentary 
committees, since a ministerial career depends essentially on the 
possibility of crossing the lofty footbridge that links the party 




























































































there is only one road, and that is to adhere to a faction! To 
refuse is to go down a dead-end road. One cannot pursue a career 
apart from factions.
RULE 9:
FACTIONS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO VETO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER 
FACTIONS
Loyalty to party and faction has priority over the collective 
responsibility of the government. In case of conflict, it is to 
the party and to the faction that ministers and undersecretaries 
of state show their loyalty. This is easy to understand since 
the appointments depend first on the faction, second on the party, 
and only thirdly on other considerations. The selection of the 
representatives of factions to the government is an internal 
affair that does not concern other factions. If someone is not 
elected by his own faction, he could not hope to be nominated by 
the chief of another. The only solution would be to switch 
factions. But double allegience is not possible, nor are intrigues 
in neighboring factions. The chief of a faction cannot request the 
inclusion or the exclusion of representatives of other factions. It 
is forbidden to hunt on the lands of other factions. Poaching is 
prohibited! It is easy to imagine the consequences of such a 
"division of territories" on the coherence of a cabinet where 
personal enemies may sit side by side.
It is to be noted in this regard that there is less democracy within 
the factions than in the party itself, which is a federation of 




























































































not on elections and ideology. It is a grouping for personal 
promotion and protection in a clientelistic chain, which descends 
through many intermediary steps from the barons to the most peri­
pheral electors.
This interdiction of veto did not exist during the breaking-in 
phase of the political system. De Gasperi opposed the appointment 
of Dossetti (who retired to a monastery), and of Gronchi, who 
finally opted for the presidency of the Chamber; this latter pos­
ition showed itself to be an excellent springboard for the presi­
dency of the Republic. But the right to veto has sometimes been 
used in the formation of coalition governments. As a condition of 
their participation (or of their support without participation), 
sane parties demanded the exclusion of this or that individual 
belonging to the rival party.
One again finds this rule, even if in diluted forms, in other coun­
tries, because wherever the government is a coalition, the rep­
resentatives of the parties are divided between loyalty to the 
chief of the government and loyalty to their party. What is pec­
uliar to Italy is the excessive importance of factions, which can 
be explained by the existence of a predominant party.
RULE 10;
THE PRINCIPAL ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AND OF THE 
PRIME MINISTER IS TO ARBITRATE, AND NOT TO SELECT
Ip a system where parties organized in factions dominate the 
parliament, the role of the president of the Republic in the 




























































































doubt that the successive presidents have managed to facilitate 
the career of a few parliamentarians, but all analysts of the 
Italian system agree that the president's role is honorific, 
except in the choice of the prime minister himself in the event 
that the leadership of the dominant party fails to propose a 
name. The "merry go round" of party chiefs and of personalities 
from the entire rainbow going to the Quirinale during ministerial 
crises, is an illustration of this discreet power of negotiation, 
which the president can exercise in going beyond the inanimate 
paragraphs of the constitution. For instance, Gronchi imposed 
Tambroni, Saragat recommended Colombo, Segni obtained the appoint­
ment of Carlo Russo, and Pertini strongly supported Spadolini. 
Tomorrow, when the historians will be able to open the archives, 
they will perhaps say that the choice of Spadolini as prime mini­
ster was the first free choice made by a president of the Italian 
(22)Republic. The personality of the president, without considering historical
circumstances, plays an important role. The distance between Gronchi and 
Pertini on one side, and Segni and Leone on the other, is enormous.
Has the President of the Republic the right of veto? Has he the 
latitude of excluding this or that personality from the list 
that the prime minister designate proposes to him? There is no 
doubt that he could exercise an efficient influence, even if dis­
creet, in this respect. In at least one circumstance, he openly 
vetoed some names. A. Piccioni succeeded in 1953 in building a 
government, but President Saragat opposed the designation of two 
ministers (Bettiol and Spataro). Piccioni, judging that the 





























































































Is the prime minister the chooser of ministers? There is in the
letter of the constitution a juridical fiction, to that effect,
without doubt prudent and wise, but which does not stand up to
any analysis. Even the presidents of the United States and of
the Fifth Republic, even the British prime minister or German
chancellor are not the only and unique choosers of ministers.
> (23)That is a well established fact.
The nine rules I have just enunciated engender the tenth and last 
rule: the selection is a complex process where the delegates of 
parties fed by their general secretaries propose or impose their 
representatives upon the prime minister designate.
It has only been since 1977 that on several occasions, the prime
minister designate has asked the parties of the coalition for a
(24)bouquet of names. In the best of hypotheses, he then has the
option of choosing between the names proposed by the parties 
themselves.
The prime minister has been able sometimes to freely choose one,
two or even three ministers, and then he has given priority
(25)either to personal friends, or to experts, particularly in
financial and economic matters.
It is nearly unanimously agreed that the prime minister has the 
right to choose freely his principal collaborator in the govern­
ment, that is to say the undersecretary of state to the presid­
ency of the Council, who, in spite of his title, plays in reality 
a more important political role than that played by most of the 




























































































a former full minister, F. Campagna, accepted, for reasons of
political equilibrium, the position of undersecretary of state
(26)to the presidency of the Council in 1981
What is the position of the prime minister in case of conflict?
Is he the chief of the majority faction or the arbiter of 
rivalries manifested within the government? How can he reconcile 
this double role? Or, if he does not play the role of arbiter, 
who does? The frequent meeting of the executive committees of 
the parties seem to indicate that there is a collective arbi­
tration, since the structure of power is collegial.
The distribution of portfolios between the factions, accompanied 
by the designation of the ministers by the factions themselves, 
might be considered as a violation of the constitution, which 
grants to the prime minister the right to choose the ministers 
and propose them to the President of the Republic. In fact, 
however, there is no violation because the government, no matter 
how it is made up, finally receives the vote of confidence in 
parliament. But obviously, what interests us here is the real 
process and not the legalistic aspect.
CONSEQUENCES: INSTABILITY OF CABINETS AND IMMOVABILITY OF KEY MEN
The chronic ministerial instability that characterizes the 
Italian political regime is balanced by the stability in power 
of a significant part of the political class, even by the quasi­
immovability of their nucleus.




























































































or more as full ministers (and in other governments as under­
secretaries of state), altogether add up to more than 500 
appointments. For instance, E. Colombo permanently remained 
in power, with an interruption of four years, between 1948 and 
1982: 25 times as minister, once as prime minister and six times 
as undersecretary of state. G. Andreotti belonged to 27 govern­
ments: 5 times as prime minister, 16 times as minister, and 6 
times as undersecretary of state. M. Rumor was present in 23 
governments nearly without interruption for more than 20 years, 
after having been general secretary of the Christian Democratic 
party for two years.
The stability of men is particularly visible at the head of the 
principal departments. Thus, all the ministers of Interior except 
four (Taviani, Restivo, Gui, Rognoni), were former prime ministers 
or en route to this position. Since 1945, Italy has had 15 mini­
sters of Foreign Affairs: 10 were previously or later prime 
ministers, the 5 others being men of the stature of Sforza, 
Saragat, Piccioni, Medici and Ruffini. Gonella was in charge 
of the ministry of Justice in eight successive governments after 
having assumed responsibility for Public Instruction in five 
governments. Andreotti was minister of Defense in eight govern­
ments. Taviani was minister of Interior seven times, minister 
of Defense five times, minister of the Treasury and Budget five 
times, and minister of the Mezzogiorno four times. Vanoni was 
minister of Finance for four years. Colombo, after having had 
the responsibility for the ministry of Industry during four 
governments, directed the Treasury in 13 governments, over seven 
years. Honour to the great leaders: De Gasperi was prime minister 




























































































In addition, during the intervals when these personalities were 
not charged with ministerial responsibilities, they were at the 
head of the dominant party or were presiding over one of the 
assemblies. Hence, they controlled the government.
These men had known each other for many years, some from their
youth. They met each other long ago in the Federation of Catholic
(27)University Students (F.U.C.I.) They launched themselves in
politics during the first years of the Republic. They remained 
present in the Roman forum for twenty or thirty years, permanently 
in parliament, with some discontinuities in government, and 
alternatively in the leadership of their party. They pursued 
their route together, in spite of political rivalries. Con­
sequently, they make up a political class in the sense that Mosca 
gives to this notion.
The length of governmental functions exercised by the 36 most 
important ministers greatly exceeds the longevity of the career 
of most of the prinicipal ministers in the so-called stable 
democracies. The ministerial instability accompanied by the 
stability of ministers also characterized the Third and Fourth 
French Republics. Whereas in Italy the parties, very well organ­
ized, have been the central channels for ministerial careers, in 
France they were weak, permitting the parliament and its perman­
ent committees to assume the selective function. In addition, 
the French political system was centripetal,which favoured the
selection of men sitting in the center of the parliamentary
. . . (28) hemisphere.




























































































secretaries of state whose collective influence was much more 
modest than that of the 133 full ministers. Most of them 
remained in government for just a short time.. They only passed 
through. They were from the ministerial point of view, ephemeral 
men even if they were meanwhile, particularly in their con- 
stitutencies, prestigious and powerful men, which they were.
If we put the political weight of the 84 most stable person­
alities, in terms of number of appointments, on the side of a 
scale, it would be much heavier than that of the 330 other mini­
sters and undersecretaries of state.
Some observers of the political game in Rome worry about mini­
sterial instability, others denounce the immovability of men.
This paradox is fictitious, because, in a multiparty-system- 
with-a-dominant-party-organized-in factions, the two phenomena 
are intimately bound together.
If it is true that to govern is to foresee, ministerial 
instability does not allow politicians to plan long-term govern­
mental policy, no matter what their personal virtues may be, and 
despite the quasi-immovability of some of them. The consequences 
of their decisions, or the absence of decision, will usually 
appear much later, at the moment when those responsible for the 
decisions are no longer present in the political forum, at least 
not at the front of the stage. But this is true to varying degrees 





























































































* Paolo Ungari, professor at the National School of 
Administration in Rome, gave me valuable suggestions and 
generously helped me with his critical comments. I express my
friendly gratitude to him and my admiration for his intimate know 
ledge of the Italian political class. Carlo Dane, from the Research
Office of the Christian Democratic Party, drew my attention to 
several important points. I extend my appreciation to him. 
neitherof them is responsible for the opinions presented here, or 
for the insufficiencies that may exist in this analysis.
1. Contrary to a tenacious error, committed even by some historians 
the Christian Democratic party did not hold the majority of the 
seats in the Senate between 1948 and 1953. It held only 149 
out of a total of 344 (including the appointed Senators).
It is not possible to detail here the reasons for these 
individual exceptions. This would take us too far afield, 





























































































3. Among the 653 ministers and undersecretaries of state, there 
are 89 members of the PSI, 53 PSD, 35 PRI, 36 PLI, 15 PCI, 7
i* ••experts, and A others.
A. For these A14 ministers and undersecretaries of state, we
counted all the governments to which they had belonged since June 
19A5 (Parri government)^ without taking into consideration the 
participation of a few in previous governments. For instance,
A. De Gasperi was minister in the two Bonomi governments and in 
the Parri government. Only the latter was counted. T h e  second 
Spadolini cabinet, identical to the first one, is included in the 
analysis, but not the Fanfani cabinet formed in December 1982.
5. One might be surprised not to see among the ministers Dossetti 
(leader of an important faction) , La Pira (who was only under­
secretary of state in one government), Mattei (executive of an 
important complex of nationalized enterprises), Cappi (general 
secretary of the Christian Democratic oartyin 19A9, and who 
became president of the Constitutional Court), Lazzati (rector 
of the Catholic University of Milan), Bonomi (president of the 
powerful organization of Coltivatori Divetti), and a few others. 
The reason that most of these personalities did not become 
ministers can be found in the nature of the positions they 
attained outside of government. As for Dossetti and La Pira . 
they simply lost the battle.
6. It is not easy to give a definition of what should be considered 
participation in the Resistance, since the individual situations 
were extremely diverse. Some concrete examples will neverthe­




























































































Considered as Résistants: Gonella, arrested in 1939 and
put in secluded residence; Gatto, arrested in Venice in 1943;
Marcora, commander of a group of partisans in Valdossola;
Piccioni, involved in clandestine struggles in Tuscany in 1943;
Scaglia, provincial commissioner of the committee of Liberation; 
Spataro, member of the national committee of Liberation; Taviani, 
one of the leaders of the insurrection in Genoa; Zaccagnini, 
member of the Garibaldi Brigade in Ravenna. Not considered as 
effectively engaged résistants: Cappa elected deputy in 1919,
1921, and 1924, who retired from politics and became a lawyer; 
Lucifredi, a lieutenant interned in a camp in Germany; Bettiol, 
whose clandestine action was limited to journalism, etc. In any 
case, the participation in Resistance did not have the same 
significance in the south as in the north, in Salerno and in 
Bologna.
7. Whereas the Christian Democratic Party obtained nearly two 
thirds of its votes from the female part of the electorate, 
only eight women represented this party in the government, and 
only one as a full minister, the other seven being only under­
secretaries of state. This distortion of representation seems 
to have been accepted. On the female preponderance in the 
Christian Democratic electorate, see M. Dogan, "Le donne italiane 
tra il cattoliccsimo e il marximo", in A. Spreafico and J. La 





























































































8. Cf. Democrazia Cristiana, Atti del Consiglio Nazionale, 18-21 
luglio 1974, Roma, Edizioni Cinque Lune, 1974, pp. 69-70.
9. M. Dogan, "How to become a Cabinet Minister in France: Career
Pathways 1870-1978^' Comparative Politics, October 1979, p. 10.
10. For this reason DeGaulle required the inclusion in the 
constitution of the principle of incompatibility between 
ministerial position and parliamentary mandate: deputies 
aonointed ministers should resign from parliament.
11. Cf. Democrazia Cristiana, op. cit., p. 70.
12. Cf. M. Calise et R. Mannheimer, "Misurare i governi: la distri­
buzione territoriale dei governanti italiani, 1948-1978," Il 
Mulino, 1981, n° 4, p. 570.
13. This equivalence may be the most important point in the so-called 
"Cencelli Manual." The paternity of this equation has been 
attributed by some to Adolfo Sarti, minister in many governments. 
During an interview, he told me that the true author is his old 
secretary, Massimo Cencelli. What is significant is the almost 
spontaneous acceptance of this proposition by the Christian 
Democratic apparatus and by the faction chiefs.
14. In the consociational democracies, proportionality is
instead applied to linguistic and religious communities. For 
instance^in Belgium, the Walloons and the Flemish have the 
right to an equal number of portfolios no matter what the 




























































































15. Some ministers are obviously very important: Treasury, Budget,
Interior, Justice; others are prestigious: Foreign Affairs, or
ministries without portfolios; others are more advantageous from
the electoral and clientelistic point of view: Post Office,
Industry, Nationalized Enterprises, etc. When a reform is
ofplanned, a department may temporarily become/a strategic impor­
tance. There are also departments of routine management which 
were accepted instead of nothing^ for these positions allowed 
for participation in the council of ministers.
16. Cf. L'Umanità, 14 octobre 1980.
17. "One could ask if a member of the delegation in charge of 
preparing, along with the prime minister, the list of 
ministers, could himself be appointed
minister. It is as though he was choosing himself." A Statement 
by a former minister^B. D'Ar ezzo^to a journalist of the 
Corriere della Serra, October 29, 1980.
18. The "tetrarchy" does not meet at the central headquarters of the 
party, but in a villa in the middle of a well protected garden.
19. Cf. oral testimony of Salvatore Valitutti, minister in the 
Cossiga government.




























































































21. Among the testimonies concerning tb° importance of factions 
one could mention that of senator F. Martinazzoli, member of
the board of the group in the Senate, who denounced "the degene­
ration of the factions, "instruments for the self selection of 
the ruleing groups", L'Unita, June 25, 1981.
22. The first politician chosen by the President of the Republic 
outside the Christian Democratic party as possible prime minister 
was B. Craxi in July 1979 , but this change appeared premature.
23. Cf. R.F. Fenno, The President's Cabinet, Vintage Bookd, 1959;
R. Rose, "The Making of Cabinet Ministers", British Journal of 
Political Science, 1971, pp. 393-414.
24. At the moment of his government, formation Spadolini
expressed his good intentions: "The parties'will give me several
names from which I will choose, as Article 92 of the onstitution
indicates. Naturally, the concern for political equilibrium will
lead me to choices which .1 hope could be inspired by criteria
Frcrn
of experience and confidence."/ newspapers of June 24, 1981.
This statement provoked the following comment from an acute 
observer: "The appointment of ministers is the most insidious
obstacle for Spadolini. The few names that the parties will 
propose could become ambushes for the prime minister designate, into 
whose hands will fall not the mission to freely choose the 




























































































of the parties are unable to exclude. This is an extremely 
delicate operation. -Spadolini would like to include in the 
government an expert in economic problems: Visentini or Baffi
to the Treasury. This will complicate the distribution of posi- 
tions." L 1 Unit a, June 25, 1981. Finally, "t'he good intentions 
of Spadolini vanished - it is useless to deny it - in the face 
of the implacable logic of parties." La Reputblica, June 30, 1981. 
Because "the problem is to build a political government composed 
of parties and not a utopian government without an anchor."
La Voce Repubblicana, June 31, 1981.
25. An example among others, of the importance of personal friend­
ships to the political career: it is notorious that the appoint­
ment of C. Mazza was principally due to his friendship with 
President Leone. It would be possible to give two dozen examples 
of undersecretaries of state or ministers who owe their first 
appointment to the friendship of an influential leader. But 
political patronage cannot . be maintained if the beneficiary 
does not prove that he possesses the qualities required of a 
member of government.
26. For instance, Taviani, as direct collaborator of De Gasperi in 
1951-1953, was undoubtedly more influential than many ministers , 
in spite of the fact that he was only undersecretary of state.
27. One example among hundreds: Moro was president of the Federa­
tion of Catholic Students at a moment when Taviani and Andreotti 
were national councillors.
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